Using new regulatory data, this paper contributes to the growing literature on derivatives markets and (systemic) risk, by providing a first account of the Dutch CDS market, investigating the factors that drive buying and selling of credit protection ('flow-of risk'), and analysing the impact of Brexit. We find that the CDS market has a 'core-periphery' structure in which Dutch banks are CDS sellers while insurance firms and pension funds (ICPF's) and ´other financial institutions' (OFIs) are buyers. When the volatility of a reference entity increases, the propensity to sell CDS decreases for banks and increases for ICPFs and OFIs. This hints at procyclical behaviour by banks and countercyclical behaviour by ICPFs and OFIs. The 'core-periphery' structure of the CDS market became more pronounced around Brexit events, making the CDS market more vulnerable to shocks emanating from 'systemic' players. Banks reduced net buying and selling of CDS protection on UK reference entities, while OFIs and investment funds became more dominant. This underpins the importance of adequate buyers for systemic institutions and extending the regulatory perimeter beyond banking.
Introduction
The credit default swap (CDS) market has grown from an exotic niche market to a large and active market for credit risk transfer making it one of the most significant financial innovations of the last decades (Oehmke and Zawadowski (2015) ).
1 In the run-up to the financial crisis, the global CDS market grew substantially, from USD 6.4 trillion in 2004 to 58.2 trillion in 2007 (BIS (2017)).
The rise of the CDS market in the 1990s and early 2000s can be attributed to the fact that CDS was meeting market participants' hedging, speculation, and arbitrage needs. Oehmke and Zawadowski (2015) show that CDS markets function as 'alternative trading venues' for hedging and speculation. Similarly, Acharya et al. (2016) show that a banks used CDS to rapidly increase their sovereign exposure in the sovereign debt crisis in Europe while reducing their risk just as swiftly later on. Kenny et al. (2016) find that CDS markets were widely used prior to the crisis due to their liquidity relative to the reference entity's bonds, and their leverage which enables the build-up of large positions with relatively small capital invested. CDS contracts were also used to hedge risk and to reduce a bank's required regulatory capital or as a part of a tax or accounting strategy to alter the treatment of a particular asset (Yorulmazer (2013) ).
Notwithstanding the benefits for the financial sector and the real economy, the CDS market has proven to be a potential source of (systemic) risk as well.
The near-collapse of Bear Stearns, the default of Lehman Brothers, and the bail-out of AIG in 2008 highlighted the fact that Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives in general and credit derivatives in particular carry systemic risk (EC (2009), p.5) . The systemic risk of the CDS market stems from the inherent leverage in CDS contracts and the high level of market concentration and interconnectedness among major players (Coudert and Gex (2010) , Kenny et al. (2016) ). These characteristics, in combination with a lack of market transparency, resulted in excessive risk taking by major dealers prior to the crisis and a sudden deleveraging and liquidity drain when concerns about counter-party credit risks 1 A credit default swap is essentially an insurance product: The protection seller agrees to make a payment to the protection buyer in case of a (pre-specified) credit event of a reference entity. In exchange for this insurance, the protection seller receives an upfront fee or periodic payments from the protection buyer. Credit events include for example bankruptcy, non-payment of debt, and, in some CDS contacts, debt restructuring (Oehmke and Zawadowski (2015) , p.1, Mengle (2007) ).
soared following losses in the sub-prime mortgage market.
Since 2007, economists have come to realize that the structure of the CDS market affects financial stability. The opaque over-the-counter nature can hide dangerous concentrations of risk. To make the CDS market safer, the G20 made a commitment in 2009 to increase transparency by mandating reporting of all derivatives transactions to trade repositories 2 , increasing margin requirements for OTC derivatives, and mandating central clearing for the most standardized products. In the EU, these G20 commitments are implemented in the European Markets Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR).
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However, the link between the financial market structure and financial sta-
bility is yet to be fully understood (Peltonen et al. (2014) ). On the one hand, connectivity in financial markets enhances financial stability because more links imply more risk diversification. On the other, connectivity increases the potential for contagion (Glasserman and Peyton Young (2015) ). In addition, not only the overall level of connectivity, but also the distribution of connections matters for financial stability. The consensus is that financial markets that are characterised by a few highly connected market participants and many sparsely connected participants, are robust to random disturbances but susceptible to shocks to the 'core' participants (Haldane (2009) , Acemoglu et al. (2015) , Allen and Gale (2000) ). This phenomenon has been termed 'robust-yet-fragile'. Empirical evidence shows that CDS markets exhibits such a potentially fragile 'core periphery' or 'scale free' structure.
Using new regulatory (EMIR) data, this paper contributes to the growing literature on derivatives markets and (systemic) risk, by giving a first account of the Dutch CDS market, investigating the factors that drive buying and selling of credit protection ('flow-of risk'), and analysing the impact of Brexit on the structure of the CDS market for UK underlyings. We are among the first to use the regulatory EMIR data as a daily time-series dataset instead of a one day cross-sectional snapshot. 4 We find that the CDS market has a 'coreperiphery' structure in which banks are CDS sellers while insurance companies 2 This commitment is part of 20 recommendations aiming to improve financial stability analysis (http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009 /2009communique0925.html, cf. Heath and Goksu (2013 ).
3 See Art. 9 of EMIR (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32012R0648).
4 See Schimmel et al. (2018) for an extensive analysis of Brexit using our data set.
3 and pension funds (ICPFs) and other financial institutions (OFIs) are buyers.
When the volatility of a reference entity increases, the propensity to sell CDS decreases for banks and increases for ICPFs and OFIs. This hints at procyclical behaviour by banks and countercyclical behaviour by ICPFs and OFIs. The core-periphery structure of the CDS market became more pronounced around Brexit events, making the CDS market more vulnerable to shocks emanating from systemic players. Banks reduced net buying and selling of CDS protection on UK reference entities, while OFIs and investment funds became more dominant.
This underpins the importance of adequate buffers for systemic institutions and extending the regulatory perimeter beyond banking.
The set-up of our paper is straightforward. Section 2 provide an overview of the relevant literature. Section 3 gives a description of the data. Section 4 to 6 provide, respectively, a first overview of the Dutch CDS market, an analysis of the drivers of the 'flow-of-risk' in the Dutch CDS market, and a case study of the impact of Brexit on the structure of the CDS market for UK underlyings.
Literature Review
This paper relates to three strands of literature. Firstly, it relates to the literature on the social costs and benefits of CDS. 5 The issue of social costs and benefits of CDS came to the fore in the 2008 financial crises when CDS and other derivative contracts were seen as the prime culprit. Stulz (2010) gives an account of the role of the CDS market in the crisis and concludes that although there are legitimate concerns, the CDS market was not the fundamental cause of the crisis.
He argues that credit default swaps increase economic welfare by facilitating risk-sharing, by improving price discovery, and by making the allocation of capital more efficient. The fundamental cause of the financial crisis was the underestimation of real estate risk and the excessive use of leverage. However, the CDS market exacerbated these vulnerabilities. According to Kenny et al. (2016) Secondly, this paper relates to the literature on financial networks and systemic risk. Early theoretical studies found mixed results regarding the relation between connectivity in financial networks and stability. Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas et al. (2000) show that more connected financial systems are less prone to contagion. These findings were based on the assumption of homogeneous financial networks which does not hold for the scale free or core-periphery structures that are observed empirically. Others, argue that interconnectedness increases the likelihood of contagion. Later studies, e.g. Gai and Kapadia (2010) and Acemoglu et al. (2015) , establish a consensus by pointing out the "robust-yet-fragile" nature of financial networks: Gai and Kapadia (2010) find a lower probability of contagion for more connected financial systems. However, contagion is more widespread if it occurs in connected networks. Acemoglu et al. (2015) find that more connected networks are better able to cope with small shocks, but also that highly connected networks are more prone to contagion when hit by a large shock. Squartini et al. (2013) show that the dynamics of financial networks can provide early signs of imminent financial crises. Financial network studies have focused mostly on interbank markets, although the literature on CDS markets has grown over the past few years. Markose et al. (2012) provide an empirical reconstruction of the US CDS market and shows that the market is dominated by a few core players. The authors argue for a 'super spreader tax' based on centrality to price in the negative externalities of interconnectedness (See also Haldane (2009) ). Cont and Minca (2015) show that liquidity problems can cause systemic risk in the CDS market, and that central clearing can help mitigate this risk if core players are a clearing member of a Central Couterparty (CCP).
Finally, the paper relates to the growing stock of empirical research into the CDS network structure. Multiple studies show that CDS markets are characterised by a scale-free distribution of market participants, and evidence the CDS market's potential to destabilize the financial system (e.g. Peltonen et al. (cf Kenny et al. (2016) ). Obviously, contagion in the CDS market is more likely if the core market participants have small capital and liquidity buffers relative to their exposures (Ali et al. (2016) , Brunnermeier et al. (2013) , Markose et al. (2012) , Siriwardane (2016) ).
Data
We use CDS transaction data provided by DTCC, the largest Trade Repository (TR) authorised under EMIR. 6 According to the ESRB, DTCC covers 80 percent of the EU CDS market (Abad et al. (2016) The left pane of Figure 2 provides an overview of the data cleaning steps that we applied, showing the distribution of remaining observations after applying each consecutive check. On average, the daily trade state reports contain 260,000 observations. During the cleaning process, around 20,000 observations are dropped, mostly due to missing or negative notional amounts, incorrect reporting of the underlying of the CDS or of maturity dates.
To enrich the data after the aforementioned cleaning steps, we augment the CDS trade state reports with the following data sets: First, GLEIF for information on counterparty name, LEI, and domicile of counterparties. 9 Second, we use the ECB's Centralised Securities Database (CSDB) for counterparty sector domicile, underlying name, and sector country.
The right hand pane of Figure 2 shows the number of observations remaining after selected cleaning steps over time. It is clear that the number of observations is trending downwards. Furthermore, it seems that the quality is constant over time. 
Total
Step 5 Step 10 Step 15 Step 20 (b) Over time 1) invalid cpa LEI 2) invalid cpb LEI 3) the notional amount should not be missing or negative 4) the reference entity should not be missing 5) non-ISIN should be removed, but keep Index CDS 6) the maturity date should be larger than the effective date 7) the maturity date should be larger than the execution date 8) termination date should not be prior to fileDate (we only want active contracts) 9) double reports are dropped 10) triplicates are dropped 11) inconsistent notionals are dropped 12) inconsistent counterparty ID 13) inconsistent counterparty side 14) inconsistent maturities 15) inconsistent reference entities 16) inconsistent intragroup flags 17) keep only one observation. 18) mtmEur/notiEur and notiEur should not be disproportional. 19) mtmEur winsorized at the top 1% 20) notiEur winsorized at the top 1%
Overview of the Dutch CDS market
This section gives a first account of the Dutch segment of the CDS market. It provides an overview of the overall market structure, the size of the market, the total risk transferred, the underlying reference entities, and the ultimate protection buyers and sellers.
We start with the network structure of the Dutch CDS market in Figure and the single name CDS market exhibit a low density level (on average 0,0008 and 0,0055, respectively) and a negative assortativity coefficient (on average -0,61 and -0,59, respectively). This is indicative of a 'core-periphery' market structure with small number of well connected core players and a larger set of peripheral players with fewer connections. -.58
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Assortativity Figure 6 provides a sectoral breakdown of the market participants involved.
As is clear from the graph, the number of market participants per sector remains quite stable over the observed period. For those participants where we observe the sector, the non-MMF investment funds are the most numerous, closely followed by banks.
The gross notional amount outstanding, as depicted in Figure 7 , represents the absolute sum of the notional value of all single name CDS contracts bought and sold. The gross notional amount is a measure for the size of the CDS market and can also be regarded as an upper bound measure for risk. The gross notional amount will substantially overstate the risk exposure because (i) the notional amount is usually larger than the potential payout on the CDS contract -which To better understand which market participants are net sellers or buyers of CDS protection, we plot a sectoral breakdown of net CDS protection sold and bought in Figure 10 . The computation of the market share for each type of counterparty follows a similar procedure as in Figure 8 . For each reference entity, we compute the market share for each counterparty and then aggregate over counterparty sectors. To obtain the overall sectoral market shares in net selling and buying, we calculate the size-weighted average across all reference entities. Given their long term investment strategies, we expect pension funds and (life) insurance companies to be CDS buyers in general. For banks, the "natural" position is less clear because some banks are intermediaries while others take on only one side, for instance to hedge an exposure (e.g., a syndicated loan participation. Cf Shan et al. (2014) ). Due to the specificities of the Dutch market, the OFI sector consists for a large part of asset managers that invest on behalf of pension funds. Because of their link with pension funds, we expect these entities to be CDS buyers as well. Of course, other types of OFIs, such as hedge funds, could be CDS sellers.
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We use the size of market participants, measured as total assets in billion USD, as a general control for the sophistication of participants. We use the Global Ultimate Owner (GUO) information from ORBIS. Missing values are substituted with total assets from annual reports.
The general tendency of market participants of a certain sector to be CDS sellers or buyers can change if market circumstances change. For instance, market participants could choose to buy more CDS protection to hedge an underlying asset that has become more volatile or to hedge general market uncertainty.
Alternatively, some market participants may take on a larger intermediating or speculative position under these circumstances, especially when traditional players leave the market. Therefore -in various specifications of our model -we include the volatility or log price change of the underlying reference entity and a measure for the overall volatility of the market (VIXX, VSTOXX) as control
variables. Since we have not yet been able to include information on market participants holdings of the reference entities underlying their CDS contracts,
we cannot empirically identify hedging, speculation or intermediation at the individual market participant level. From a macro perspective, however, it is still relevant to find patterns in the flow of risks from CDS positions, as this can help identify and understand channels for contagion between sectors under different market circumstances. where subscript i and j denote the counterparties (with j = i ), r is the reference entity, and t is the date. netSell ranges from -1 to 1. This measure is subsequently transformed into a dummy variable that indicates whether a counterparty is a net CDS protection seller for a given reference entity on a particular date:
with 0 < x < 1. This indicator function allows us to exclude market participants with balanced positions (e.g. if they act as intermediaries) from the regression, in order to focus the analysis on net buying and selling. This dummy variable will serve as the dependent variable in our logistic regression model, where we have set the threshold value x to equal 0.1. Figure 11 shows the distribution of netSell per sector. Overall, Dutch market participants have more buying positions than selling positions (note that our measure does not take into account the size of the position). Other financial institutions (OFIs) have the largest share of buying positions, followed by insurance companies and pension funds.
There are a few market participants, most notably banks, that seem to fulfil an intermediary role indicated by NetSell values around zero. The results of our logistic regression analysis are presented in an overview table (Table 3) , a table with the average prediction probability (Table 4) , and figures with marginal effects over selected explanatory variables (Figures 12 and   13 ). (Table 3 ) displays coefficients as odds ratios. For ease of interpretation, we discuss our results based on the marginal effects plots.
We find that banks are generally net CDS seller while ICPFs and OFIs are net CDS buyers. Table 3 shows that a market participant's sector is both a statistically and economically significant factor in all specifications, indicating that banks have a higher probability of being CDS sellers than ICPFs and OFIs. Table 4 shows the average predicted probabilities of being a net CDS seller for each sector (conditional on the mean of all covariates). It indicates that banks are generally net sellers of CDS protection (with probabilities above 50%), although this result is less pronounced if only the top 10 underlying reference entities are considered (Model 2). The other sectors (OFIs and ICPFs) are on average net buyers of CDS protection (with probabilities below 50%) although the probability of being a seller is higher for the most active reference entities. The statistical and economic significance of the other independent variables in our model depend on the specification. For ease of interpretation, Figure 12 and Figure 13 show -for our two baseline specifications -the predicted probabilities per sector for representative values of the independent variables. The figures show that the probability of being a net CDS seller decreases as banks' size (in 20 terms of total assets) increases. The same result emerges for ICPFs. On the other hand, larger OFIs seem to have a higher probability of being a net seller if they are larger.
In the baseline specification, we see that banks are less inclined to be sellers of CDS protection if the volatility of the underlying reference entities increases.
ICPF and OFIs on the other hand, seem to have an increased probability of CDS selling at higher volatilities: if we compare the (hypothetical) case of equally and average sized banks, ICPFs, and OFIs, the latter two sectors would even have an equal or larger probability of being a net CDS seller compared to the banks. This could be a reflection procyclical investment behaviour by banks and countercyclical behaviour by ICPFs and OFIs
13 . An explanation could be that banks limit their trading activities or withdraw from the CDS market when volatility is high because they have capital utilization constraints and strict limits to risk measures (i.e. VaR limits) while other types of financial companies have more room to manoeuvre due to smaller capital constraints and less regulatory scrutiny on their risk limits. However, it should be noted that the results are influenced by the assumption of average sized institutions (ICPFs and OFIs are on average smaller -in terms of total assets -than the total sample's average).
The volatility of the market, as measured by the volatility of the VIX, seems to have no effect on the probability of being a CDS seller. This interesting and surprising result could be caused by the overall low level of market volatility in the observation period.
In the second baseline specification, we run our model for the top 10 underlying reference entities only (top 10 in terms of total notional outstanding in the market). Again, banks (ICPFs) propensity to sell CDS decreases (increases) as the volatility of the underlying reference entity increases. In contrast to the general baseline case, OFIs now have a lower probability of being a net CDS seller as the underlying volatility increases. Interestingly, net selling of CDS protection on the top 10 underlying reference entities is more sensitive to market 13 Note that our results could be interpreted both along the time series and cross sectional dimension. In other words, our findings could indicate that the propensity to sell CDS on a reference entity decreases (increases) for banks (ICPF and OFIS) if the volatility of a single reference entity increases over time. Alternatively, our findings could suggest that banks have a relatively higher propensity to sell CDS on less volatile reference entities, while ICPF and OFIs have a relatively higher propensity to sell CDS on more volatile reference entities. It goes beyond the scope of this paper to disentangle these two dimensions. When considering the alternative specification with log returns for the underlying reference entities and the VIX index (Model 3), we again find that market volatility has no effect on position taking in the CDS market. In addition, banks have a lower probability of being a net seller if negative returns are observed for the underlying reference entity. ICPFs and OFIs do not seem responsive to returns. This is in line with the results of our baseline model. When quadratic effects are considered (Model 4), a non-linear relation emerges for the effect of the underlying return. For all sectors, the probability of being a net CDS seller is higher when returns are in the tails of the distribution. This could indicate that all sectors to some extent use CDS for hedging and speculative purposes.
Note, however, that these results are estimated with more uncertainty (as it can be seen from the confidence interval bars in Figure 12 and Figure 13 and the statistical insignificance of the regression coefficients in Table 3 , Column 3).
We conducted various robustness checks but overall our results seem to hold up. First, we estimated the model for different values for x, ranging between 0.1 and 0.3, and found that the results did not change significantly (which also is evident from Figure 11 ). We also analysed if our results were sensitive to including other benchmarks for market volatility by replacing the VIX measure by VSTOXX (a European stock market index) and found no effect. Finally, we examined if the results would change if only the contracts on the most important underlying for each market participant were considered (i.e. if the notional In sum, when focussing on Dutch counterparties only, we find that banks are on average CDS protection sellers while ICPFs and OFIs are CDS buyers.
Looking within sectors, we observe that the probability of being a seller is lower for larger banks, and higher for larger OFIs. This unexpected outcome caused substantial market turmoil. On 24 June, the value of the British pound dropped by more than 8% against the US dollar.
In addition, the main European equity indices fell sharply. The FTSE250, an important indicator for the performance of British business, lost more than 7%.
Similarly, the Dutch AEX dropped by 5.7% and the Eurozone Eurostoxx50 by 8.6%. The equity market losses were particularly severe for European banks.
Share price losses were even worse than those after Lehman's bankruptcy filing.
CDS spreads also increased, but less than after Lehman's default (Schiereck et al. (2016) ).
Given the substantial impact of Brexit on other financial markets, it is worthwhile to investigate the impact of Brexit on the structure of the CDS market. We do so by providing an overview of the development of several common network metrics (number of 'nodes' and 'links', the 'density' of the network, and its 'assortativity' 14 ) as well as an overview of changes in net selling and buying of CDS on UK reference entities by Dutch market participants over the course of 2016. Note that this case study gives a first descriptive account of the impact of Brexit. Further research is needed to evaluate the econometric significance of the trends we observe around Brexit.
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14 The density of the network measures the fraction of actual links in the network relative to all possible links, i.e. (number of edges/(n*(n-1)) while the assortativity measure indicates how similar interacting counterparties are. A high positive assortativity coefficient indicates that nodes with a similar degree tend to connect. High degree nodes thus connect with other high degree nodes and nodes with very few degrees connect with other low degree nodes.
15 See Schimmel et al. (2018) for an econometric analysis of Brexit using the same data set.
We expect market participants to place bets and hedges in the run up to major Brexit dates, which we expect to be reflected by an increase in the number of nodes (market participants entering the CDS market) and and increase in the number of links (signalling new trading connections). Moreover, we expect that new market participants that enter the market are mostly 'peripheral'
players that buy or sell CDS protection via 'core' dealers. We therefore expect to observe a decrease in the density of the network, as well as a decrease in assortativity. Finally, drawing on the finding from Chapter 5 that banks might exhibit procyclical trading behaviour and non-banks may act countercyclically, we expect that banks will take on a relatively smaller role, and non-banks a relatively larger role, in selling CDS.
The results of our analysis corroborate our expectations. At first sight, as indicated by Figure 14 the network of the Dutch CDS market for UK reference entities does not seem to change around the Brexit vote. A different picture emerges, however, when the development of the network metrics are considered over a longer time window (Figure 15 ): after the referendum date, we observe a small drop in the number of counterparties (reaching a minimum in August)
followed by a sharp increase starting in September and accelerating in October.
The October jump may be explained by Theresa May's announcement to enact
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, thereby officially starting the process to exit the EU. The increase in the number of links between counterparties in the run up to the referendum date, and again around May's announcement in October, may be indicative of market participants 'placing their bets' on the outcome (i.e., taking hedging, speculative, or arbitrage positions).
In addition, we observe that the density of the network is generally low: only 4-5% of all possible links are active in the first half of 2016. The assortativity of the network is negative, indicating that most connections are between dissimilar counterparties. These observations are in line with the characteristics of the coreperiphery structure of the CDS market, in which a few well connected core players act as intermediaries for many less connected peripheral market participants (cf. Anand et al. (2018) also find a core-periphery structure for UK and US CDS markets). After the Brexit vote, a small increase and subsequent sharp decrease
Using extensive break tests, the authors find no significant change around any of the important dates. Banks also lose market share in terms of net buying of CDS protection, while the predominance of other financial intermediaries increase.
Synthesizing the findings of existing literature on network theory, one could argue that the more pronounced core-periphery structure due to the Brexit event makes the market more vulnerable to shocks emanating from core players. This stresses the importance of ensuring that core or systemic market participants are robust and hold adequate buffers. The increased activity by non-banks around the Brexit events underpins the importance of expending the regulatory perimeter beyond banking. 
Conclusions and discussion
The 2007-09 financial crisis showed that the CDS market can contribute to systemic risk. Using new regulatory (EMIR) data, this paper aims to contribute to the growing literature on derivatives markets and (systemic) risk. To this end this paper provides a first account of the Dutch CDS market, investigates the factors that drive the flow-of-risk using logistic regression, and analyses the impact of Brexit on the structure of the CDS market for UK underlyings.
Over the course of 2016, we observe on average 3,800 market participants in our dataset of which 790 hold single-name CDS positions with a notional value around EUR 150 billion. The single name CDS contracts are written on governments (34%), financials (33%) and non-financial corporations (23%). The CDS market has a core-periphery structure and is very concentrated. The top five buyers and sellers account for 40% of the single-name CDS market. Looking at the sectoral level, we observe that banks are the major net single-name CDS sellers and buyers, investment funds are the second largest group of sellers, and other financial institutions are the second largest group of buyers.
Focussing on Dutch counterparties only, we find that banks are on average CDS protection sellers, while insurance companies and pension funds (ICPFs) and other financial institutions (OFIs) are CDS buyers. Within sectors, the probability of being a seller is lower for larger banks, and higher for larger
OFIs. ICPFs and OFIs seem to increase CDS selling if the volatility of the underlying reference entities increases, while banks reduce CDS selling. This hints at procyclical behaviour by banks and countercyclical behaviour by ICPFs 28 and OFIs. Although not statistically significant, we observe for all sectors that CDS selling increases when returns on the underlying are at either tail of the distribution, which might be an indication that all sectors, at least to some extent, use CDS for both hedging and speculative purposes.
Using common network metrics, we find that Brexit did not disrupt the market for UK reference entities. We observe that the core-periphery structure of the CDS market for UK underlyings became more pronounced as market participants placed bets and hedges around Brexit events, arguably making the CDS market more vulnerable to shocks emanating from systemic players. Also, banks reduced net buying and selling of CDS protection on UK reference entities, while OFIs and investment funds became more dominant CDS buyers and sellers.
This underpins the importance of adequate buffers for systemically important market participants and extending the regulatory perimeter beyond the banking sector.
The EMIR data are extremely rich and can be used to inform micro-and macroprudential supervision and policy. This paper showed that EMIR data can give insight into the developments derivatives market structures and risk flows among banks as well as non-bank financial institutions. Future research could be geared towards increasing our understanding of speculative or hedging behaviour by analysing derivatives transaction data in conjunction with data on asset holdings. Also, to further improve our understanding of financial market structures and financial stability, future research could investigate the factors that drive changes and/or persistence in market structures and the implications for financial stability. An important question in this regard is whether nonbanks can act as shock-absorbers. Combining EMIR data with other granular supervisory data is key to answering these questions but also time consuming as managing such large volume data sets is not a trivial matter. 
